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“Uncritical Citizenship” in a “Low-





Mozambique is one of the poorest and most underdeveloped societies in the 
world. While poverty and the lack of infrastructure have many social and 
political consequences, perhaps the most important from the standpoint of the 
country’s democratic development are the limitations these obstacles place on 
the ability of its people to act as full citizens.  Yet even compared to other poor 
societies, Mozambicans suffer from extremely low levels of formal education 
(the adult literacy rate is 46 percent, compared to an average of 61 percent 
across all low income countries),1 and extremely low levels of access to public 
information: the country has just three newspapers per 1,000 people (compared 
to 44 for low income countries), 14 television sets per 1,000 (compared to 84), 
and 44 radios per 1,000 (compared to 198).2  Extremely low rates of formal 
education, high levels of illiteracy and limited access to news media strike at the 
very core of the cognitive skills and political information that enable citizens to 
assess social, economic and political developments, learn the rules of how 
societies and governments function, form opinions about political performance, 
and care about the survival of democracy.   
 
As we will detail in this paper, data from the Afrobarometer demonstrates that 
relatively high proportions of Mozambicans are consistently unable to answer 
many key questions about the performance of government or the democratic 
regime, or to offer preferences about what kind of regime Mozambique ought to 
have.  Those Mozambicans who are able to offer opinions grant their political 
leaders and institutions high levels of trust and approval, and perceive low levels 
of official corruption. They offer these glowing views even as many respondents 
tell interviewers they are critical of what their government has done in several 
different policy areas, have great difficulty working with government agencies, 
are dissatisfied with their personal circumstances, and live in desperate poverty.  
Most importantly, those Mozambicans who are able to offer opinions exhibit 
some of the lowest levels of commitment to democracy measured by the  
 
                                                 
1  “ICT Dialogue: Mozambique,” World Development Data. 
 
2  World Bank Development Report (2005): 310-312. 
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Afrobarometer across 18 African multi-party systems. At the same time, 
Mozambicans are some of the most likely to say their country is democratic.  
Thus, there are many reasons to suspect that Mozambicans uncritically overrate 
the performance of their new democratic regime. 
 
In a comprehensive overview of public opinion in older democracies, Pippa 
Norris (1999: 3) has traced a growing tension between the promise of 
democracy and the reality of the performance of democratic institutions to the: 
emergence of more ‘critical citizens,’ or ‘dissatisfied democrats,’ who adhere 
strongly to democratic values but who find the existing structures of 
representative government, invented in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
to be wanting as we approach the end of the millennium. 
 
Such “critical citizenship” requires citizens who offer their leaders neither “blind 
trust” nor cynical, knee-jerk distrust, but rather display a healthy skepticism 
(Almond & Verba, 1962; Mishler & Rose, 1997).  However, the combination of 
Mozambicans’ very high levels of trust in leaders and institutions with very low 
levels of commitment to democracy means that they present precisely the 
opposite archetype: that of “uncritical citizenship.”   
 
In this paper, we explore the extent to which Mozambicans’ apparent pattern of 
“uncritical citizenship” is a function of living in a “low-information society” 
(with the primary features being a lack of schooling and limited access to news 
about politics and public affairs).  While modernization theory has classically 
cited education and the development of cognitive skills as one of a broad bundle 
of “social requisites of democracy” (alongside urbanization, industrialization, 
affluence, and the expansion of the middle class) (Lipset, 1959; Almond & 
Verba, 1963; Inkeles & Smith, 1974), Geoffrey Evans and Pauline Rose (2007: 
2) demonstrate that the actual evidence of the impact of education in developing 
societies is “surprisingly thin.”  And while there is a great deal of evidence of a 
positive link between education and pro-democratic attitudes in older, developed 
democracies (as well as increasing evidence from Eastern Europe),3 some 
American political scientist now argue that the role of knowledge and cognitive 
skills is overstated.  They claim that the poorly informed tend to reach the same 
political opinions and decisions as the well informed, largely because they 
utilize “low information reasoning” using personal experience of commonly 
accessible information (like prices, joblessness, housing construction etc…) as 
heuristic cues to evaluate government performance (Popkin, 1994; Lupia &  
 
                                                 
3  See Evans & Rose (2007: 2-6) for an excellent overview of this literature. 
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McCubbins, 2000).  And latter day modernization scholars see education more 
as a “marker” of material security which is actually the main driver of pro-
democratic values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).   
 
But we also consider alternative explanations.  We ask whether such a set of 
uncritical public attitudes may reflect not so much a lack of education and 
information as the fear created by sixteen years of civil war, the domination of a 
range of potential alternative sources of political information by Frelimo (the 
governing party), as well as Frelimo’s recent electoral gains that threaten to 
entrench its electoral dominance.  We also investigate whether the “uncritical” 
mindset reflects a socially embedded and culturally transmitted set of 
orientations shaped by indigenous tradition and two centuries of Portuguese 
colonial rule, orientations that conflict with and thus inhibit the extent to which 
Mozambicans embrace the values that underlie democracy?  Finally, we probe 
the extent to which Mozambique’s electoral system contributes to this syndrome 




Mozambicans’ Awareness and Evaluations of 
Government and Democracy 
 
Our main purpose in this paper is to explore the linkages between key 
characteristics of a “low information society” -- especially Mozambique’s 
schools and mass news media -- and key elements of democratic citizenship.  In 
particular, we are interested in assessing the extent of Mozambicans’ political 
information, or the extent to which they are able to provide a range of basic 
political facts and the identity of key leaders.  Second we assess Mozambicans’ 
degree of what we call “opinionation,” or the extent to which people are able, or 
willing to offer assessments of the democratic regime and state. Third, we assess 
what we here call “criticalness,” or the extent to which those respondents who 
are able to offer substantive opinions offer negative, or critical assessments.  
Finally, as implied in the introduction, we assess two distinct dimensions of 
popular attitudes to democracy.  On one hand, we assess the Mozambicans’ 
perceived supply of democracy provided by their multiparty regime, and the 






To what extent are Mozambicans aware of the identity of their leaders and the 
larger political process?  Measuring citizens’ information is always a tricky 
affair; findings often differ sharply depending on whether researchers ask 
respondents to recall certain facts from memory, or recognize them from a list of 
several possible answers.  Thus, because the Afrobarometer uses the recall 
method, one should be aware that our findings might understate the actual level 
of awareness.   
 
Mozambicans are relatively well aware of the identity of the largest political 
party in the country: 68 percent were able to offer the name of Frelimo as the 
largest party, which puts the country right around the median point of the 
Afrobarometer country rankings.  Yet while 73 percent of Frelimo identifiers 
can provide this information, just 56 percent of independent voters (those who 
identify with no political party) and an even lower 46 percent of opposition 
identifiers are able to do so.   
 
However, Mozambicans are relatively unaware of several other key political 
facts.  For example, just one in five (20 percent) -- the lowest of all 18 
Afrobarometer countries -- were able to tell interviewers how many terms the 
President is allowed to serve (two terms), with the level dropping to 16 percent 
in rural areas.  By way of contrast, nine in ten Namibians and Batswana were 
able to supply the correct answer for their country.  And just eight percent (4 
percent in the countryside) were able to tell interviewers that it was the 
responsibility of the courts to ensure that legislation was constitutional.  While 
this very low figure was similar to the tiny minorities measured in over half the 
Afrobarometer countries, it was far lower than the 45 percent of Nigerians who 
were aware of the role of their courts in judicial review. 
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Figure 1: Political Knowledge -- Biggest Party? 
 
 
Figure 2: Political Knowledge -- Term Limits 
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Just one in four Mozambicans were able, when asked, to provide interviewers 
with the correct name of the President of the National Assembly (25 percent).  
City-dwellers were twice as likely to know this (37 percent) than rural (15 
percent).  Mozambicans also have some of the weakest grasps of the identity of 
their MPs and local councilors. One third (30 percent) were able to offer the 
correct name of their local councilor, and one in ten (13 percent) were able to 
give the correct name of an MP who represents their province (in Mozambique’s 
system of proportional representation, MPs are elected on provincial lists).  
Information about local councilors is relatively similar across party 
identification, and rural and urban status, but awareness of MP identity is not: 18 
percent of people living in urban areas know their MPs name compared to 10 
percent in the countryside. The impact of partisan identification also reverses: 21 
percent of opposition supporters can provide the correct name of their MP 
compared to 14 percent of Frelimo identifiers and 8 percent of independents. 
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Figure 4: Incumbent Awareness -- Deputy President 
 
 
Figure 5:  Incumbent Knowledge -- MPs and Councilors 
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From these individual question items, we can build a broader additive index that 
is both reliable and valid and runs from 0 to 6 for the number of correct answers 
each respondent is able to provide to these questions.4  Fully 23 percent of all 
Mozambicans were unable to provide a correct answer to any of these questions.  
The average (mean) Mozambican was able to provide 1.6 correct answers to the 
six questions (with the score ranging from 1.4 in rural areas to 2.0 in urban), 
which puts it third last ahead of Cape Verde and, again, Benin  
 
Figure 6:  Correct answers provided by Mozambicans to questions on 
incumbent identity and key political facts 
 
 
Figure 7: Citizen awareness of incumbent identity and key political facts 
 
                                                 
4  Factor analysis identified two factors, the first of which explains 36.2 percent of total 
variance with an Eigenvalue of 2.17.  Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .64) is acceptable 
(n=22,600).  Also a comparison of questions on awareness of incumbents with previous 





Beyond their grasp of factual information about the political process, to what 
extent are ordinary Mozambicans able to offer substantive preferences and 
opinions about key issues of democracy and governance?  To a large degree, the 
answer depends on whether people are being asked for their normative 
preferences or for empirical assessments, as well as the immediacy with which 
the issue affects their personal lives.   
 
A broad overview of responses to questions located across the entire 
Afrobarometer questionnaire reveals that Mozambicans are quite willing and 
able to state their value preferences when they are provided with both sides of a 
conflict of political or social values.  For instance, when asked to indicate 
whether they agreed with Statement A (“People should look after themselves 
and be responsible for their own success in life”) or Statement B (“The 
government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people”), 
just 3 percent said they did not know and another 3 percent stated they agreed 
with neither option. On none of many similar items contained in the 
Afrobarometer did the combined percentages who said they “don’t know” or 
“agree with neither” go above 15 percent, and most were well below 10 percent.   
 
However, people were far less able to state their values when the question either 
did not provide a balanced set of “forced-choice” alternatives, or when the 
question dealt with a more abstract concept like democracy.  Thus, when asked 
whether they would approve or disapprove of a range of non-democratic 
alternatives to multi-party elections, 16 percent of Mozambicans had no view on 
the possibility of military rule, and one in five (19 percent) were unable to offer 
an opinion when it came to the issue of abolishing elections and parliament to 
allow for presidential dictatorship.  And fully one quarter (24 percent) had no 
opinion on whether democracy was preferable to all other forms of government.  
In fact, the term “democracy” is unfamiliar to significant proportions of the 
populace.  While only 8 percent simply had no response opinion to the question 
“What, if anything, does `democracy’ mean to you?,” an additional 20 percent 
admitted that they could not understand the word “democracy,” either in 
Portuguese or when translated into a local language. 
 
By contrast, Mozambicans are able to offer evaluations about a range of 
economic trends or government performance on issues that directly affect their 
personal lives.  For example, just 1 percent was unable to tell interviewers about 
their current living conditions, and only 5 percent could not offer a view on the 
present situation of the national economy. But the numbers of those unable to 
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offer an opinion about political and economic conditions also increased 
consistently and substantially as the object of the question grew more distant 
from the daily purview of the respondent.  For example, 12 percent could not 
judge the performance of President Armando Guebuza, the dominant figure in 
Mozambican politics (though at the time of the survey, Guebuza had only been 
in office for five months).  One in five (19 percent) could not offer an opinion 
on the performance of Parliament, and one in three (29 percent) could not judge 
the performance of their local councils.  One in five was unable to say whether 
members of parliament (18 percent) or local councilors (21 percent) “try their 
best to listen to what people like you have to say.”  
 
And once we move to more remote institutions or sensitive issues, the 
percentages rise even higher.  One quarter were unable to say how well the 
country’s electoral system  did in allowing people to replace bad leaders (28 
percent) or ensure that the members of parliament reflects public opinion (24 
percent).  At least one in four were unable, or unwilling to offer an assessment 
of how many officials in the Presidency (26 percent), MP’s (26 percent), local 
government officials (26 percent) or local councilors (30 percent) were involved 
in corruption, rising to as many as 30 percent for judges and magistrates.  And 
while just 10 percent were unable to offer a view on whether the 2004 elections 
had been free and fair, 16 percent could not rate their level of current 
satisfaction with the way democracy works, and 21 percent could not rate the 
level of democracy in the country. 
 
In order to compare Mozambicans’ ability to offer opinions with other Africans 
in an efficient way, we created two valid and reliable summary measures of the 
extent to which respondents offer opinions (whether positive or negative).  The 
first index simply sums the number of substantive opinions (positive or 
negative) that respondents were able to offer across 20 question items on the 
supply of democracy (the freeness and fairness of elections, satisfaction with 
democracy, and the extent of democracy), and the supply of good governance 
(the extent of official corruption, the responsiveness of elected representatives, 
the degree to which the electoral system produces accountability, and the overall 
job performance of key incumbent leaders).5  Based on this, Mozambicans fall 
well below the Afrobarometer average (fourth lowest) in terms of being able to 
offer views on the supply of governance and democracy (a score of 16.3 out of a 
possible total of 24).   
 
                                                 
5  Factor analysis identified five factors, the first of which explains 40.1 percent of total 









The second index measures people’s ability to tell interviewers whether or not 
they demand democracy, by summing whether or not respondents were able to 
offer a meaning of democracy, and provide preferences about democracy and 
non-democratic alternatives across 5 survey items.6 In these terms, 
Mozambicans were tied for third lowest amongst the 18 Afrobarometer 
countries (with a mean of 4.1 out of a possible five questions). 
 
                                                 
6  Factor analysis identified two factors, the first of which explains 43.9 percent of total 











Not only are many Mozambicans unable or unwilling to offer opinions, those 
who do offer opinions are also especially unlikely to be critical of the 
performance of the multi party regime, institutions or leaders.  For instance, 
eight in ten respondents said they trust the President (81 percent) and approved 
of his performance in the previous twelve months (81 percent).  And three 
quarters said they trust Parliament (75 percent) and approved of its overall job 
performance (73 percent).  Not only are Mozambicans far more likely to express 
trust than distrust, they are also very likely to place total trust in their political 
leaders, choosing the most extreme response category available.  Two thirds of 
all respondents (67 percent) said they trusted the President “a very great deal” 
while only 14 percent trusted him “a lot.” This pattern also applied to the 
public’s view of Parliament (56 percent trusted it a “great deal” and only 19 
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percent “a lot”).  In fact, for every single institution that the Afrobarometer asks 
about, the modal response was one of total, rather than qualified trust.7 
 
Levels of approval of government performance in specific policy areas were 
relatively lower, but still high in absolute terms, ranging from 70 percent 
approval of government handling of health and educational policy (with job 
creation, keeping prices stable, combating HIV/AIDS all receiving over 60 
percent approval) to a low of 42 percent approval of its job in narrowing income 
gaps. And even though both Transparency International (2006) and the World 
Bank rate Mozambique as one of the most corrupt countries in the world,8 a 
relatively modest 19 percent of Mozambicans feel that “all” or “most” national 
government officials are involved incorruption. 
 
Yet these high levels of trust in political leaders and general incumbent approval 
co-exist with relatively critical views on a range of other issues.  For instance, 
while 61 percent said they approved of government performance in job creation, 
68 percent also said job opportunities had become worse over the past few years.  
And even as 59 percent gave the government positive marks for managing the 
economy, four in ten (40 percent) agreed that “government’s economic policies 
have hurt most people and only benefited a few,” and 51 percent said the gap 
between the rich and poor had widened.  
 
But, more commonly, popular responses revealed a pattern of internal 
contradiction, in which people expressed trust in institutions even in the face of 
poor performance. Three quarters of people (71 percent) said they trust the 
police even though four in ten (40 percent) said it was “difficult” or “very 
difficult” to get help from the police, and another 17 percent reported being 
victimized in the past twelve months by a police demand for a bribe or a favour.  
And 65 percent said they trust their local government council, though only 57 
percent approved of its overall job performance, and though 40 percent said 
their council was handling local road maintenance “fairly” or “very badly,” and 
34 percent said they were doing a bad job keeping their communities clean. 
 
And given what we learned in the previous section, the ratio of positive-to-
negative responses would be even greater if we were to exclude those 
                                                 
7  This distinction is inspired by the work of William Mishler and Richard Rose (1997) who 
pointed out the importance of such differences on the other end of the scale, differentiating 
between distrust, skepticism and blind trust to understand how Eastern and Central Europeans 
viewed post communist institutions. 
 
8  See Transparency International (2006) Corruption Perceptions Index 
(www.transparency.org). 
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respondents unable to offer a substantive opinion.  In fact, we create such a scale 
that measures the balance of positive versus negative views amongst only those 
who offer an opinion.  When viewed in these terms, Mozambicans rank as 
second last among the 18 countries in terms of their propensity to offer critical 
views about the supply of good governance,9 and one of the four lowest 
countries in terms of offering critical views of the supply of democracy.10   
 




                                                 
9  Factor analysis identified five factors, the first of which explains 35.0 percent of common 
variance with an Eigenvalue of 8.40.  Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .91) is very high 
(n=22,600).  
 
10  Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.00) which explains 66.7 









Democracy: Supply and Demand  
 
Following earlier work (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes & 
Bratton, 2007), we assess the extent to which Mozambicans feel they are living 
in a democracy and also measure the degree to which Mozambicans say they 
want to live in a democracy. On the supply side, Mozambicans perceive a 
relatively high degree of democracy in their country today.  Three quarters of 
Mozambicans told interviewers that the country’s 2004 election was either 
“completely free and fair” (57 percent) or “free and fair, but with minor 
problems” (20 percent).  And three quarters believe that the country is “a full 
democracy” (35 percent) or “a democracy, but with minor problems” (29 
percent).  Three in five were either “very” (31 percent) or “fairly satisfied” (28 
percent) with the way democracy works in Mozambique. 
 
On the demand side, however, significantly large minorities -- and sometime 
pluralities -- of Mozambicans remain uncommitted to democratic government.  
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While 80 percent agree that “we should choose our leaders in this country 
through regular, open and honest elections,” they are not yet completely sold on 
the necessity of multi-party elections.  Fully one-third (33 percent) agree in a 
separate question item with the statement that “Political parties create division 
and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in 
Mozambique.”  Similarly, one third (33 percent) approve of an alternative form 
of government where “only one political party is allowed to stand for election 
and hold office. 
 
Many Mozambicans are also quite comfortable with the idea of very strong, 
even dictatorial leaderships. One third (34 percent) agree that “Since the 
President was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or 
court decisions that he thinks are wrong”; four in ten (42 percent) would 
approve of an alternative system of governing the country whereby “elections 
and the parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything”; 
and one in five (19 percent) would approve of the alternative where the army 
“comes in to govern the country.” 
 
We develop valid and reliable scales of supply and demand out of smaller 
subsets of these items.  On the supply side, we calculate the percentage of people 
that both thinks they are living in a democracy and are satisfied with the way 
democracy works.  Just under one half of all Mozambicans could be classified as 
feeling “fully supplied” (48 percent). This lagged behind only Ghana (64 
percent), Namibia (61 percent), Botswana (54 percent) and South Africa (53 
percent).11  On the demand side, we calculate the percentage of people that reject 
presidential dictatorship, military rule and one party rule, and prefer democracy 
to non democratic forms of government.12  By this measure, just one quarter of 
Mozambicans (27 percent) can be classified as “committed democrats.” In sharp 
contrast to perceptions of supply, where Mozambicans have some of the highest 
levels in Africa, this figure is tied for the lowest level amongst the 18 
Afrobarometer countries, statistically indistinguishable from the 24 percent of 
Namibians who are committed.  Obviously, there are many Mozambicans who 
think they live in a democracy, but do so from a perspective of not being terribly 
concerned about whether or not they want to live in one.   
 
                                                 
11  The two items are sufficiently correlated (Pearson’s r = .61) and reliable (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .76) to warrant the creation of a two item average construct (n=22,600). 
 
12  Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.88) which explains 46.9 








As argued at the start of this paper, Norris (1999: 3) has documented the 
growth of “critical citizens” in Western democracies, that is, people who 
support democracy but increasingly find the existing structure of government 
wanting.  In contrast, the combination of very high levels of trust in leaders 
and institutions with very low levels of commitment to democracy 
demonstrates that Mozambicans present precisely the opposite archetype: that 
of “uncritical citizens.”  In order to operationalise the concept of critical 
citizens, we create an individual level measure of whether or not a respondent 
received the level of democracy they desired by taking each person’s average 
scores for both supply and demand (which was scaled to run from 0 to 4), and 
subtracted the supply score from the demand score.  This yields a new score 
that runs from +4 (indicating a sharply critical democrat who deeply wants 
democracy but perceives absolutely no democracy) to -4 (indicating a 
completely uncritical, acquiescent citizen who has absolutely no desire for 
democracy, but feels his or her country is completely democratic).  Across 18 
countries and 21,500 respondents, the average (mean) score is + .61 (with a 
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standard deviation of 1.5), indicating that the average African wants slightly 
more democracy than she or he thinks they are receiving.  Yet it also indicates 
that a large proportion of African responses generate scores below the “0” 
point, meaning that these respondents’ perceived supply of democracy 
outstrips their desire.  The average (mean) Mozambican, however, has a score 
of -.55, the lowest of all 18 countries (though Namibians are in a statistical 
dead heat at -.50). 
 
 
Mozambicans’ Levels of Cognitive Awareness 
of Politics 
 
The rest of this paper focuses on the connections between the “low information” 
nature of Mozambican society and its relatively distinctive profile of public 
attitudes toward governance and democracy.  To do this, we begin by describing 
various constituent elements of a broad concept that we have elsewhere called 
“cognitive awareness” about politics and democracy (Bratton, Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes and Bratton, 2007).  Cognitive awareness includes 
not only the amount of information that people possess about politics and 
democracy, but also their exposure to information through typical sources such 
as the broadcast and print news media or through alternative sources such as 
friends and neighbors, the associations to which they belong, and the community 
leaders with which they may come into contact.  It also includes the cognitive 
skills acquired through formal education, or alternatively, through an abiding 
interest in politics and regular interpersonal discussion of politics that provides 





We begin by examining the basic social institution that provides a society with 
the cognitive skills with which to acquire and process information: the school 
system. How much formal education have Mozambique’s citizens enjoyed?  The 
survey results indicate that Mozambique has the lowest level of schooling 
amongst its adult population in Southern Africa, and one of the lowest in Africa.  
As of mid 2005, 28 percent of all adult Mozambicans said they had no formal 
education (though 8 percent say they have had some informal schooling).13  One 
                                                 
13  In other countries, such as Senegal and Mali, we have found that “informal schooling” 
largely reflects Islamic Koranic schooling.  However, in Mozambique, Moslems are no more 
likely to have attended “informal schooling” than Christians. 
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in three (33 percent) have only had some primary education, 14 percent have 
completed primary school, and just one in ten adults have completed a high 
school education.  A total of three percent have gone beyond high school, but 
just 0.03 percent had completed a university education.   
 
This is clearly a reflection of the legacy of Portuguese colonialism which 
provided Africans with only primary education in Catholic schools which 
required Africans to abandon their given name for a Portuguese one and to 
convert to Catholicism.14 Only Europeans, Asians and a few “assimilated” 
Africans were able to attend secondary and high schools.15  The situation was 
further exacerbated after independence by 16 years of brutal civil war which 
destroyed much of the existing educational infrastructure.16   
 
Yet there is also some good news in these statistics.  First of all, while 28 of this 
sample of citizens 18 years and older had no formal schooling as of 2005, other 
analysts have estimated that as recently as 2000, 64 percent of the population 15 
years and older had no schooling.17  The sharply improving trends implied by 
this finding are indeed visible in the Afrobarometer data once we disaggregate 
by age.  While none of the figures are as high as those estimates, it shows that 
48 percent of those aged 56-65 had no formal schooling, while only 15 percent 
of those aged 18 to 24 fell into this category.   
 
                                                 
14  After independence, most skilled Portuguese workers left the country due to Frelimo’s 
nationalization policy, leaving the public administration without qualified human capital.  To 
keep government institutions functioning, the Frelimo government imported skilled workers 
from the Soviet Union.  Students with secondary school, but no teacher training, were 
compelled to become teachers. 
 
15  Assimilated natives were those who had been socialized in western culture.  Most of these 
were “coloured,” children of unions between Portuguese fathers and Mozambican women.  
 
16  The existing school infrastructure was destroyed and all 17 years and older had to do 
compulsory service in the army.  By the end of 1980, Renamo guerrillas controlled two-thirds 
of the country leaving the government confined to provincial capital cities.  In these cities the 
few school vacancies were reserved for the most successful students.  Other students lost their 
vacancies in favor of younger students or transferred to alternative night schooling. While 
night schooling attempted to be more inclusive, it often could not function due to constant 
electricity cuts in many capital cities. Some cities went as many as six months without 
electricity. 
 





While Mozambique’s level of education is the lowest in southern Africa, it is 
still considerably higher than in Benin, Mali and Senegal (though about one in 
five Senegalese and Malians say they have had informal schooling).18  We note, 
however, that citizens of all three of these countries are consistently far more 
likely than Mozambicans to offer opinions, offer critical evaluations, and 
demand for democracy than Mozambicans.  
 




                                                 
18  In terms of high school attainment, however, Mozambique is not any better off than these 
countries. 
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News Media Use 
 
Not only do adult Mozambicans possess low levels of formal education, they 
also have very low rates of access and use of formal news media.  Just thirteen 
percent regularly read newspapers (8 percent every day, and 5 percent a few 
times a week), a figure higher only than Lesotho, Mali and Benin.  Again, much 
of this reflects the legacies of the Portuguese colonial state which bequeathed 
Mozambique with a very weak mass media network: just one radio station 
(Rádio Moçambique), and two daily newspapers (Diário de Moçambique and 
Notíciais) and one weekly newspaper (Domingo).  Though the country now has 
greater media pluralism than before, few people have access to newspapers.  
According to the World Bank, Mozambique as of 2000 had just 3 daily 
newspapers per 1,000 people, significantly lower than the sub-Saharan average 
of 12; higher than Mali (1), but far lower than Ghana (14), Zambia (22 percent), 
Botswana (25) or South Africa (26).19 Moreover, very few are distributed 
outside of provincial capital cities, leaving many towns, boroughs and rural 
areas without any access to print media.  While one in five city dwellers (23 
percent) read newspapers on a regular basis, just 5 percent of rural citizens do 
so. 
 
Figure 14: Newspaper Readership 
 
 
                                                 
19  World Bank, 2005 World Development Indicators, p. 312-313.  
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Just one quarter say they regularly watch news programs on television (16 
percent everyday and 8 percent a few times a week). This proportion is lower 
than in all countries surveyed except Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho and Uganda.  
Television was only introduced in Mozambique in 1982, with a single public 
station that was accessible only in the Maputo area. Access was broadened to 
reach the country’s second biggest city (Beira) in 1994, and has now spread to 
provincial capital cities and some towns and boroughs.  Accordingly, 44 percent 
of those in urban areas said they get news from television on a regular basis 
compared to just 9 percent in the countryside. Viewership is also limited by the 
availability of affordable sets: just 19 percent of Mozambicans say they own a 
television and most of these people are located in the cities (32 percent live in 
urban areas, compared to 9 percent for rural).   
 





Mozambique’s public and private radio stations are by far the most accessible 
and widely used form of news media. Yet while two thirds of all adult 
Mozambicans say they get news from the radio either every day (49 percent) or 
a few times a week (21 percent), this figure ranks ahead of only Madagascar, 
Zimbabwe and Lesotho.  Radio listenership is limited by the supply of radio 
stations.  The only radio station that comes close to covering the entire country 
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(Radio Mozambique) is owned by the state. Community based stations are 
owned both by the state and civil society agencies.  Many rural areas still remain 
without any radio coverage.  But it is also limited by the supply of affordable 
radio sets.  Only two thirds (66 percent) said they own a radio, far lower than the 
81 percent of South Africans and, perhaps surprisingly, the 80 percent of 
Senegalese and Malagasy who do so. 
 







We have thus far seen that relatively few Mozambicans are regularly exposed to 
news about politics or public affairs via the print or electronic news media.  Yet 
even if large numbers were regularly exposed, we have also seen that few people 
have the advanced cognitive skills provided by formal education that would 
enable them to process and interpret the information about public affairs 
provided by the news media. It is possible, however, that some citizens can 
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make up this deficit in education and news media exposure.  In the absence of a 
formal education and the news media, they can remain mentally engaged with 
politics and public affairs by taking an active interest in and regularly talking 
about politics with their spouses, families, neighbors or co-workers, adding their 
experiences to those of others (Richardson & Beck, 2004).   
 
The Afrobarometer data suggests that people living in a “low information 
society” like Mozambique can still remain relatively engaged with the political 
process.  Two thirds of respondents said they are either “very” (38 percent) or 
“somewhat interested” (29 percent) in politics and public affairs.  A similar two 
thirds said they talk about politics with friends and family “frequently” (25 
percent) or ”occasionally” (43 percent).  Both figures put Mozambicans around 
the Afrobarometer country average. 
 










Alternative Sources of Information and State 
Domination  
 
Citizens in a “low information” society like Mozambique not only have 
alternative ways to develop cognitive political skills, but also may access 
political information from sources other than the news media.  They can glean 
important information about the larger political world from the secondary 
associations they join, or the government or community leaders with which they 
come into contact.  Yet in a country like Mozambique, not all of these 
alternative sources of information are equal, especially in the degree to which 
they contribute to democratic citizenship. The specific informational 
environment where people get their information may have an important effect 
on political attitudes that can be more, or less conducive to democratic 
consolidation.  Gunther, Montero and Torcal (2006), for example, focus on the 
nature of intermediation in a wide variety of democratic systems distinguishing 
between informational intermediaries that are explicitly partisan from those that 
are ostensibly apolitical and non-partisan.  However, a different distinction may 
discriminate between formal and alternative informational sources that are 
 26
aligned with the state or ruling party versus those that remain relatively 
independent (Shenga, 2007).   
 
This is especially relevant in a country like Mozambique where ruling party and 
government officials have been moving the political regime away from 
democracy over the past few years (Shenga, 2007).  Mozambique has regressed 
from being categorized by Freedom House as an “electoral democracy” to what 
Diamond (2002) has called an “ambiguous” regime.  Freedoms are limited and 
corruption is high (CPI, 2005; Freedom House, 2005).  Organizational leaders or 
party or state officials who are actively subverting the quality of democracy are 
likely to transmit messages to their members or constituents that are detrimental 
to democracy.   
 
On the other hand, influential community leaders and opposition party officials 
that remain outside the orbit of state control are more likely to convey messages 
that are more conducive to forming positive attitudes to democracy.  They are 
more likely to be critical about the conduct of government and more likely to 
desire political goods like accountability, competition, rule of law, and inclusive 
participation, if only as a way to achieve their own political goals.  
 
Mozambique’s particular conundrum is that not only do its citizens possess 
relatively low levels of information about public affairs, but the three decades of 
monopoly over formal political power by the Marxist oriented Frelimo party 
(first through an explicit one party system, then through growing electoral 
dominance under multi-partyism) means that available information about public 
affairs is often conveyed by or through sources that are anything but fonts of 
independent and critical information.   
 
First, large sections of the electronic broadcast and print news media are under 
the control of the state: we have already mentioned Radio Moçambique; but the 
major television station (TVM), and largest daily (Notiçias, Diário de 
Moçambique) and weekly (Domingo) are also state controlled.20 Second, 
significant sections of civil society are explicitly or implicitly aligned with the 
state. For example, the predominant trade unions (such as Organização dos 
Trabalhadores Moçambicanos-Central Sindical (OTM-CS) are explicitly pro-
government, having either been created, dominated or historically favored by 
Frelimo.  The business community is also largely pro-government, consisting of 
a significant proportion of the old bureaucratic elite of the Frelimo one party 
                                                 
20  Savana, Demos, Embondeiero are some of the independent weekly newspapers with 
significant circulation.  A new media bill is currently being drafted by the state Information 
Office that would require all news journalists to register with the government and carry an 
official card (Mosse, 2007). 
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state who have since taken advantage of their positions and now run or manage 
newly privatized companies that often benefit from state bank loans granted 
either at nominal interest rates, or with no expectation of repayment at all.  This 
community’s “main capital is precisely their link with Frelimo and its state” 
(Pereira & Shenga, 2005: 56). Thus, citizens affiliated to these types of 
organizations are more likely to receive information favorable to the state, rather 
than critical of it. 
 
The range of the community, party or state leaders through which citizens 
ordinarily might learn something about politics are also likely to be aligned to 
the Frelimo party-state system.  This applies not only to the typical array of 
Frelimo party officials and officials of government ministries, but also to local 
councilors and traditional leaders.  While there are a healthy (though declining) 
number of opposition party MPs which citizens may contact, the electoral 
system (Provincial List Proportional Representation) reduces the incentives of 
both MPs and citizens to contact one another.  MPs must please party bosses 
rather than citizens, and citizens come to discover that MPs may have limited 
ability to deliver goods to constituents or turn their preferences into policy 
outcomes. And since Renamo boycotted the country’s first local government 
elections in 1998 over irregularities in voter registration, the opposition has been 
poorly represented in municipal councils.  There were absolutely no opposition 
councilors across the country from 1999 to 2003, though independents won 
some seats in Maputo City.  Since 2004, Renamo has controlled just four of 33 
municipalities. Thus, any information about politics and democracy obtained 
from contact with local elected representatives will mostly have a Frelimo tint to 
it. Traditional leaders also collect local taxes and have been officially described 
in Government Decree Number 15/2000 as a continuation of the state 
bureaucracy at the community level.   
 
On the other hand, church or community development or self-help organizations 
are more independent and less dominated by the state. Thus, not only do 
Mozambicans have relatively little low levels of access to the development of 
cognitive skills and the usual sources of political information in the news media, 
but they are also probably more likely than other Africans to get the little 
information that they do have from state aligned sources.   
 
 
Membership in Secondary Associations 
 
We now turn to establish the number of Mozambicans who might be able to 
make up the deficit of formal education and news media exposure by joining 
and interacting with secondary associations or by contacting community and 
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political leaders. We first examine civil society membership. Significant 
numbers of people belong to the types of civic associations that in Mozambique 
are more likely to be aligned with the state. One in four (23 percent) are 
affiliated with either a trade union or farmers’ association (with 12 percent 
active members and 1 percent official leaders), and a surprising 16 percent who 
say they are affiliated with a business or professional group (with 8 percent 
active and 1 percent a leader).  Both figures put Mozambique around the middle 
of the 18 Afrobarometer countries. 
 





Figure 20: Active membership professional / business association 
 
 
But a far larger proportion (81 percent) of Mozambicans told interviewers that 
they are affiliated with some form of religious association.  While about a third 
(31 percent) characterizes themselves as “inactive members,” 44 percent say 
they are active in these groups, and another 6 percent say they are official 
leaders. This also places Mozambique around the middle of the 18 
Afrobarometer countries. 
 
Figure 21: Active membership religious groups 
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Just one in five (19 percent) say they are affiliated in some way with a group 
that is involved with community development issues, and just one in ten are 
active (9 percent active leader, 1 percent official leader). This figure places 
Mozambique in the bottom half of our 18 countries, and is twice as low as 
places like Tanzania, Senegal and Nigeria, and four times lower than Kenya and 
Malawi.   
 






But regardless of whether or not they formally belong to any organized 
associations, three quarters of Mozambicans (76 percent) say they attended a 
community meeting in the previous year (with 37 percent saying they’d done so 
“often”), and a similar 69 percent reported “getting together with others to raise 
an important issue” (28 percent did so “often”).  The latter figure is tied with 
Madagascar for the highest levels of community participation. Thus, there 
appears to be no evidence of any ingrained predisposition against getting 
involved in community affairs. 
 






Contacting Community and Political Leaders 
 
And to what extent are Mozambicans able to gather information by speaking 
with political and community leaders?  The answer is “not much,” if we view 
the question in terms of elected leaders.  Mozambicans have extremely low rates 
of contact with elected leaders.  They have the lowest rate of contact with local 
councilors of all 18 Afrobarometer countries (just 9 percent had contacted one in 
the previous year). And just seven percent of Mozambicans said they had 
contacted an MP, which was a statistical tie for the lowest ranking position with 
Benin (6 percent), South Africa (5 percent ) and Madagascar (5 percent). 
 






Yet when it comes to non-elected leaders, Mozambicans have relatively high 
rates of contact. One in five respondents (21 percent) said they had made contact 
at least once with a party official in the past year (7 percent did so “often”), 
which statistically ties Lesotho (23 percent) for the highest recorded rate in the 
Afrobarometer. And 15 percent said they had made at least one contact with a 
ministry or government official (with 4 percent “often”).  Frelimo supporters are 
more likely to contact elected representatives:  nine percent made contact with a 
local councilor, compared to five percent of opposition supporters; eight percent 
contacted an MP (compared to six percent for opposition, and 16 percent made 
contact with a government or ministry officials (double the rate of opposition 
supports, seven percent).  Interestingly, there is no difference between the rate of 
contact with party officials between opposition (23 percent) or Frelimo (22 
percent) supporters. 
 





Mozambicans’ rate of contact with community leaders lies right around the 
Afrobarometer midpoint. One in two people (53 percent) said they had contacted 
a religious leader at least once in the past year (with 19 percent doing so 
“often”), one in three (31 percent) contacted a traditional leader (13 percent 
“often”), and 17 percent had contacted some other community leader (6 percent 
often).  Traditional leaders are the one institution with which rural dwellers (36 
percent) are more likely to contact than their urban counterparts (24 percent).  
 




In summary, we have seen that extremely few adult Mozambicans have had any 
substantial schooling, let alone high school or university degrees. And besides 
the radio, small minorities have regular exposure to news about politics or 
public affairs. Yet, at the same time, they are relatively motivated to engage with 
the political process through interest and interpersonal discussion.   
 
While a majority belongs to a religious group, only small minorities belong to 
community associations, trade unions or business groups.  Yet large majorities 
say they have attended a community meeting and joined with others to 
accomplish something in their community. And while very small proportions 
 
 35
come into contact with elected leaders, larger minorities get to see government 
or party leaders, and a relatively large number of people are in contact with 
community leaders, many on a fairly regular basis.   
 
 
Connecting Cognitive Awareness and 
Democratic Citizenship in Mozambique 
 
While the first section of this paper described four separate cognitive aspects of 
democratic citizenship (political information, opinionation, criticalness, and 
attitudes to democracy), this final section attempts to explain these attitudes by 
first focusing on the role of formal education and news media use, and then 
considering a range of alternative explanations such as values, political fear, 
actual political and economic developments, and the electoral system.   
 
 
The Role of Cognitive Awareness 
 
We use a series of multiple regression models to assess the extent to which 
Mozambique’s distinctive pattern of public attitudes are a function of the lack of 
formal education, access to the news media, and political information?  
Furthermore, we probe whether relatively poorly informed citizens are able to 
use more experiential means like interpersonal discussion, attending group 
meetings or contacting officials to make up cognitive deficits and gain 
additional information about politics and public affairs?  Finally, we examine 
whether it matters if citizens use news media, belong to associations, or contact 
officials that are aligned with the state or governing party?  
 
The results displayed in Table 1 indicate that political information is not a 
random, meaningless ability to answer “quiz-show” type questions about 
political trivia.  Examining the first column in Table 1, we can see that political 
information in Mozambique is driven first and foremost by formal education.  
But even taking the impact of education into account, watching news programs 
on television and listening to them on radio (but, notably, not by reading 
newspapers) also makes an important, independent and positive contribution.  
But the results also demonstrate that people with no formal education or who 
never make use of news media can make up some of their informational deficit 
through interpersonal discussion, joining collective action groups and, 
surprisingly, contacting officials from government ministries. 
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Looking across the first row in Table 1, we can see that political information is, 
in turn, a very potent predictor of several other important variables.  Even after 
controlling for Mozambique’s large rural-urban divide, and the privileged 
position of those who speak Portuguese, knowledge of incumbents and facts 
about governance and democracy greatly increases Mozambicans’ ability to 
offer opinions about the performance of government and the democratic regime, 
as well as their ability to form preferences about political regimes or demand 
democracy.   
 
As we have seen above, the formal education possessed by small minorities of 
the Mozambican population plays a crucial role in helping them become more 
informed about the political system.  But even after adding political information 
to the model, formal education continues to play an important role in 
contributing to people’s ability to offer opinions on performance, form regime 
preferences and demand democracy.  While radio and television news do make 
important contribution to the accumulation of political information, news media 
use has extremely few effects on cognitive elements of citizenship or attitudes to 
democracy.  Newspaper readership does contribute to demand for democracy, 
but those who obtain news from television (which is largely state dominated) are 
actually less committed to democracy.   
 
Cognitive engagement has effects on most of the dependent variables assessed in 
the various models in Table 1.  However, interest in politics is consistently more 
important than interpersonal discussion.  But while interest is almost always an 
important part of the explanation, its contribution to democratic citizenship is 
not always positive.  Political interest enables people to offer more opinions and 
preferences, yet among those respondents with opinions, interest in politics 
reduces the likelihood that they will offer critical opinions. And while it 
increases demand for democracy, it also increases Mozambicans tendency to 
(over)rate the extent of democracy in their country. 
 
Our analysis finds few consistent contributions from interpersonal contact or 
organizational affiliation. Membership in a community development group does 
enable people to form opinions about performance of government and 
democracy, but it also leads those who do have opinions to be less critical of 
performance, and leads all members to be more likely to perceive a higher 
supply of democracy. Attending community meetings enables more 
opinionation, but also detracts from a sense of critical democratic citizenship.  
And while joining collective action groups contributes to political knowledge, it 
also leads to less critical views of performance.  The only positive impact with 
any real consistency comes from citizen contact with religious leaders.  Net all  
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other influences, those citizens who most frequently seek out religious leaders 
for help solving important problems are more able to form preferences about 
democracy, more likely to demand democracy, and more likely to be a critical 
democrat.   
 
Overall, cognitive factors explain a significant share of the variation in political 
information (Adjusted R2 = .243), and more modest shares of opinionation about 
performance (Adj. R2 =.183) and political regimes (Adj. R2 =.168) and demand 
for democracy (Adj. R2 = .116).  However, they explain little about whether or 
not those Mozambicans’ who have opinions are more or less critical. 
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Cognitive Awareness        
Political Information -- .211*** .190*** NS -.083* .096** .139*** 
Formal Education    .297*** .110*** .107** NS NS .177*** NS 
Radio News  .077** NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Television News    .131*** NS NS NS NS -.080* NS 
Newspapers NS NS .072* NS NS .096*** NS 
Interest in Politics NS .107*** .170*** -.093* -.095** .106*** .143*** 
Political Discussion .127*** .103*** NS NS NS NS NS 
Alternative Sources         
Member, Religious 
Group 
NS NS NS NS NS .061*** NS 
Member, Development 
Group 
NS .058* NS -.117* NS NS .141*** 
Member, Trade Union NS .087** NS NS NS NS NS 
Member, Prof Group NS NS .108*** NS NS NS NS 
Attend Community 
Meetings 
NS .103*** .085** NS NS NS NS 
Joined With Others  .058* NS NS -.125** -.132*** NS NS 
Contact, Rel Leader NS NS .068** NS NS .090*** NS 
Contact Govt Official   .088** NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Contact Trad Leader NS NS NS NS .072** NS NS 
Control Variables        
Rural -.070* -.183*** -.031 NS -.068 NS -.092* -.089** .070* 
Portuguese -.003NS .002NS -.060* -.060 NS .066* -.056 NS -.038 NS 
        
Adjusted R2 .243 .183 .168 .045 .045 .116 .070 
N 1199 1197 1198 480 883 1199 1199 




We now turn to consider whether alternative approaches offer better 
explanations of Mozambique’s distinctive profile of public opinion.  We pay 
particular attention to the issue of whether the impact of cognitive factors 





We begin by examining the role of values. A culturally oriented explanation 
would argue that Mozambique’s profile of “uncritical citizenship” is rooted in a 
syndrome of orientations that are the consequence of both indigenous traditions 
and two centuries of Portuguese rule and which undermine the values necessary 
for a democratic society (see Chazan, 1993;Owusu, 1992; Mamdani, 1996; 
Etounga-Manguelle, 2000).  First of all, popular emphases of the communal 
good combined with the history of traditional rule may lead people to see 
themselves as clients dependant on neo-patrimonial “big men” to provide for 
their welfare.  Second, popular emphasis on the communal good may also mean 
that the generation of just outcomes is valued over the rule of law. Third, the 
patriarchal nature of many African polities may undermine the commitment to 
equality.  Fourth, emphases on consensus may breed intolerance of dissent or at 
least popular acceptance of government crackdowns on expression.  And finally, 
centuries of colonial autocracy may lead people to see themselves as passive, 
deferential subjects of external forces rather than as agents, or democratic 
citizens with the right to question authority and accountability (Mattes & Shin, 
2005).   
 
The Afrobarometer asked a range of questions to tap these various facets of 
political culture.  Taken together, the responses suggest that images of a subject 
political culture in a place like Mozambique may need to be reconsidered.  For 
instance, in order to measure clientelism, the Afrobarometer asked people about 
the provision of welfare.  While a significant number of Mozambicans still see 
themselves as dependent on the state, the figures are not overwhelming.  Just 
over one half (53 percent) agree that “The government should bear the main 
responsibility for the well-being of people.”  And just a little more than one third 
(38 percent) agree with a classic feature of clientelism that: “Once in office, 
leaders are obliged to help their own community.”   
 
To tap popular support for the rule of law, we asked three questions, the answers 
to which form a valid and reliable index.  Again, people are far more likely to 
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support the pro-democratic value than the conventional wisdom might suggest.  
Eight in ten agreed that “It is important to obey the government in power no 
matter who you voted for” (81 percent), and that “it is better to find legal 
solutions to problems even if it takes longer” (79 percent), and seven in ten said 
that “the use of violence is never justified in Mozambican politics today” (69 
percent).21 
 
In contrast to the typical view, political and gender equality are also strongly 
valued by Mozambicans.  Again, eight in ten feel that “All people should be able 
to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in a an election: (82 
percent) and that “women should have the same chance of being elected to 
political office as men” (81 percent), while three quarters agree that “women 
should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men” (just 14 percent 
agree with the proposition that: “Women have always been subject to traditional 
laws and customs, and should remain so” (76 percent).22 
 
To be sure, significantly smaller proportions of Mozambicans support freedom 
of expression.  Two thirds (66 percent) agree that “the news media should be 
free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down” (but 
one fifth -- 21 percent -- say that “Government should close newspapers that 
print false stories or misinformation”). Just over half (55 percent) of all 
respondents say that “People should be able to speak their minds about politics 
free of government influence” (while one third (35 percent) support the view 
that “Government should not allow the expression of political views that are 
fundamentally different from the views of the majority). And one half (49 
percent) agree that “We should be able to join any organization, whether or not 
the government approves of it” (and over a third -- 37 percent -- support the idea 
that “Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its 
policies”).23 
 
                                                 
21  Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.58) which explains 52.6 
percent of the common variance.  Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .55) is acceptable 
(n=21,592). 
 
22   Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.54) which explains 
51.2 percent of the common variance.  Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .51) is low and 
barely acceptable (n=20,389). 
 
23   Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.58) which explains 




The typical view of political culture in a place like Mozambique does, however, 
resonate much more strongly when it comes to public values about citizen 
agency and their duty to hold leaders accountable.  Just over one half (55 
percent) say that “we should be more active in questioning the answers of our 
leaders.”  And when asked who was responsible for “making sure that, once 
elected,” Members of Parliament or councilors “do their jobs,” just 8 percent 
and 11 percent respectively answered that it is “the voters” task to hold elected 
leaders accountable.  In contrast, the most frequent reply was that this was the 
President’s job (46 percent for monitoring MPs, and 39 percent for local 
government).  Around one fifth answered “the parliament” (21 percent) or the 
“local council” (21 percent), and about one tenth pointing to the political party 
(10 percent and 11 percent respectively).24 
 
 
Political Fear and Intimidation 
 
From a completely different perspective, one might suspect that Mozambicans’ 
tendencies to decline to provide opinions and, or provide rose-coloured 
assessments of political performance when they answer are not reflections of 
deeply held values, but rather of the political fear and intimidation that endures 
from a decade and a half of civil war and increasing electoral dominance of the 
country’s ruling party. In order to assess the impact of political fear and 
perceived intimidation on the survey response, we first asked people for their 
partisan identification (73 percent said Frelimo, up substantially from 2003, 8 
percent said Renamo, and 18 percent said they do not feel close to any political 
party).  We also asked people about how often they feel people “have to be 
careful of what they say about politics?”  Over two thirds answered that people 
“always” (41 percent) or “often” (28 percent) have to curb their speech in 
Mozambique. At the same time, just under two thirds (63 percent) say the 
“freedom to say what you think” in Mozambique is better now than a few years 
ago. Finally, we asked people in the very last question posed during the 
interview: “Who do you think sent us to do this interview?” Well over half of all 
respondents felt that the fieldworker was sent by the government (57 percent). 
                                                 
24  The two items are strongly correlated (Pearson’s r = .74) and strongly reliable (Cronbach’s 





Finally, a third alternative explanation might simply conclude that 
Mozambicans’ optimistic assessments of government and democratic 
performance are simply a reflection that things are, in fact, getting better – at 
least in terms of the direct experiences of ordinary people.  Thus, we turn to a 
range of questions that tap people’s reported experiences with a range of 
economic developments such as everyday poverty,25 and economic trends,26 as 
well as ill-health27 and personal loss due to AIDS related deaths.28  We also 
identified a series of measures of people’s experience with political phenomena 
such as the existence of freedom and rights,29 the ease with which they are able 
to work with state agencies,30 and the extent to which they are victimized by 
                                                 
25  The questions asked people how many times in the past year they had gone without food, 
water, medical care, cooking fuel, and a cash income.  Factor analysis extracted a single 
unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.59) which explains 51.9 percent of the common variance.  
Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .77) is very high (n=21,562). 
 
26  Three questions assessed people’s personal living conditions now, over the past year, and 
in comparison to other people.  Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue 
= 1.80) which explains 60.3 percent of the common variance.  Index reliability (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .67) is very high (n=21,536).  Two questions measured people’s assessments of 
national economic conditions now and over the past year.  The two items are sufficiently 
correlated (Pearson’s r = .41) and reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha = .58) to warrant the creation of 
a two item average construct (n=21,580).  Finally two items measured people’s expectations 
of improvements in both their personal living conditions and the national economy.  The two 
items are strongly correlated (Pearson’s r = .77) and reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .87) is 
very high (n=21,586). 
  
27  The questions asked people how much work they had missed in the past month due to their 
physical health and how often they had felt tired or exhausted due to worry or anxiety.  The 
two items are strongly correlated (Pearson’s r = .59) and strongly reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha 
= .74) warranting the creation of a two item average construct (n=21,592). 
  
28  The question asked people whether they knew a close friend or relative who had died of 
AIDS. 
 
29   Four questions asked people whether they were freer now than a few years ago to join 
organizations, vote the way they wanted, and whether they were freer from crime or from 
arbitrary arrest.  Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.38) which 
explains 59.7 percent of the common variance.  Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .76) is 
very high (n=21,577).  
  
30  Five questions asked respondents how easy they found it to obtain identity documents, 
household services and medical treatment from state agencies, a place in school for their 
children, and help from the police.  Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor 
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bureaucrat and police demands for extortion payoffs.31 However, we specifically 
avoided using more subjective assessments of proximally distant phenomena 






The results displayed in Table 2 demonstrate that values matter. The narrow 
majority of Mozambicans who value freedom of expression are significantly 
more likely than those who support government suppression of dissent to have 
opinions, to demand democracy, and are less likely to say they are living in a 
democracy.  Similarly, the seventy to eighty percent of respondents who value 
rule of law are also more likely to have opinions and demand democracy, though 
they are not as critical of the supply of democracy.  Finally, the narrow majority 
who believe that citizens should question leaders are more likely than those who 
say we should have more respect for authority to have opinions, to criticize the 
supply of democracy, and to demand democracy. 
 
Is there any evidence of the impact of explicit fear or more implicit political 
pressure on respondent answers?  We find that those respondents who thought 
the interviewer was from a government agency were actually more likely to 
provide an opinion about democracy and its alternatives, but otherwise exhibited 
no other significant difference.  The same finding applies to those who said that 
it is not safe to speak their minds about politics in the country today.  We also 
find that those who perceive a declining level of freedom of speech over the past 
few years are less likely to demand democracy, but as we will see below, so are 
those who perceive declines in other rights and freedoms.  Finally, we observe 
strong partisan impacts with Frelimo identifiers more likely to offer opinions on 
performance or form regime preferences, but less likely to offer critical opinions 
(compared to non partisans).  Opposition supporters are also more likely to form 
regime preferences (than non partisans) but much more likely to criticize the 
performance of the democratic regime. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Eigenvalue = 2.10) which explains 42.0 percent of the common variance.  Index reliability 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .65) is acceptable (n=21,577). 
   
31  Five questions asked respondents how many times in the past year they had to pay a bribe 
in order to get an identity document, a place in school for children, household services, 
medical treatment, or to avoid a problem with the police.  Factor analysis extracted a single 
unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.52) which explains 50.4 percent of the common variance.  
Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .75) is high (n=21,584).   
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To what extent is Mozambique’s distinctive profile of uncritical citizenship 
simply a result of citizens’ actual experiences with an improving society?  We 
find that those Mozambicans who experience a greater supply of political 
freedom and think the national economy is improving are less likely to criticize 
the supply of governance and democracy. And those who have positive 
experiences interacting with state agencies are also less likely to be critical.  
Finally, those who have been victimized by extortion at the hands of state 
bureaucrats and police are more likely to offer opinions, and are more 
demanding of democracy (yet, oddly, are also more likely to think the country is 
democratic). 
 
Overall, the addition of cultural values, perceptions of political fear or pressure, 
and economic and political experiences greatly increases our ability to account 
for levels of critical evaluations among those Mozambicans with opinions, and 
the perceived supply of democracy amongst all respondents.  But cognitive 
factors retain a strong effect (net all these other influences) in the models 
explaining opinionation, demand for democracy, and the supply of democracy.  
Political information remains the single strongest predictor of opinionation and, 




Table 2.  Explaining Attitudes to Democracy in Mozambique: Cognitive, Cultural, Political, and Pressure Factors 
Compared 
 Opinionation 















Cognitive Awareness       
Political Information    .155***    .183***   .073*     .108*** 
Formal Education .080*     .119***      .156*** -.061* 
Interest in Politics    .148*** .074*  -.060*    .104***      .097*** 
Political Discussion  .088*     
Alternative Sources       
Member, Trade Union   .081** -.092*  .071**  
Member, Business Group   .127***  .078**     
Attend Community Meetings   .084**       .112*** 
Joined With Others   -.091*  -.086**   
Contact Religious Leader  .089**    .084**  
Values       
Freedom of Expression (I)    .092***      .202*** -.070** 
Rule of Law (I)   .121***    .090***    -.097***   .160*** .058* 
People Should Question Leaders  .058* .120**    .076**  
Leaders Should Treat All Equally     -.069**  
Citizen Experiences       
Lived Poverty (I)   -.097***      
Personal Loss to AIDS     .065*  
Personal Economic Conditions (I)      .083* 
National Economic Conditions (I)   -.148***  -.146***     .108*** 
Increased Economic Goods (I)     -.111***    .084** 
Relative Deprivation   -.134***  -.053*  
Easy to Work with State   -.143*** -   
Official Victimization (I)   .090***  .122***        .084*** .060* 
Increased Freedoms (I)   -.245***  -.096***     .136*** 
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 Opinionation 















Fear and Intimidation       
Identifies W/ Governing Party  .071*  .089** -.147***   .068* 
Identifies W/ Opposition   .081**     .317***   -.148*** 
Less Freedom of Speech       -.073**  
Have To Be Watch What You Say     .099***     
Thinks Interviewer From Govt     .106***     
Control Variables       
Rural -.028NS   -.089*** -.025NS -.037NS -.053NS -.049NS 
Portuguese  .051NS -.002NS -.043NS   .084** -.033NS -.045NS 
       
Adjusted R2 .188 .237 .248 .252 .201 .208 
N 1075 1196 470 870 1188 1181 






Finally, we wonder whether Mozambicans’ cognitive deficits in politics have 
been exacerbated by the country’s choice of electoral system.  Because list 
proportional representation systems, such as Mozambique’s, place inordinate 
power in the hands of party leaders who control the lists, legislators’ have far 
more of an incentive to please their party bosses than any identifiable group of 
voters.  Thus both MPs and citizens have little motivation to actively seek out 
each other, exchange information and learn from one another, either by 
expressing policy preferences or sharing experiences of problems. 
 
While all previous models in Tables 1 and 2 have focused within Mozambique, 
assessing the impact of a variable that affects an entire country (like a national 
electoral system) requires that we expand the scope of our analysis to compare 
respondents across countries (see Table 3).  Once we do so, we find that even 
after holding constant for a multitude of cognitive, cultural, partisan and 
performance related factors, the electoral system has a very important impact.  
In fact, list PR (measured here as a dummy variable, with single member district 
systems as the excluded category) has the single strongest impact on political 
information.  Moreover, its impact is negative.  In other words, compared to 
citizens who live in single member district systems, those Africans who live in 
countries that use proportional representation are systematically less able to 
provide the name of their member of parliament (which would be expected).  
But, less predictably, they are also less able to give the correct name of their 
local councilor, the Deputy President or the largest party in the legislature, know 
the correct limit on presidential terms or understand the role of the courts.  And 
perhaps most importantly, over and above the effect of political knowledge, PR 
also decreases people’s ability to offer opinions or form preferences on issues of 
governance and democracy, decreases the frequency with which those with 
opinions will offer critical evaluations, and decreases the demand for 
democracy.   
 
 48
Table 3:  Explaining Attitudes to Democracy in Africa: Cognitive, Cultural, Political, Pressure and 




















Cognitive Awareness        
Political Information X .128 .140 .128 ..066 .166 -.055 
Formal Education .308 .161 .112   .114  
Radio News Use .089 .086 .103     
Television News Use .068  .076   .111  
Newspaper Readership .071       
Interest in Politics   .059 -.062    
Political Discussion .090 .103 .061 .050  .085  
Alternative Sources        
Member, Development Group   .053     
Attend Community Meetings .088   -.066    
Contact Local Councilor .083       
Contact Traditional Leader   .058     
Values        
Equality (I)   .070  -.071 .054  
Freedom of Expression (I)      .120  
Rule of Law (I)   .060  -.093 .151 .095 
Accountability (C)   .054 .083     
People Should Question 
Leaders 






















Citizen Experiences        
Lived Poverty    .059 .064   
Personal Loss to AIDS  .085      
National Economic Conditions 
(I) 
   -.164 -.146  .137 
Increased Economic Goods (I)   -.055 -.252 -.141  .157 
Relative Deprivation    -.073 -.059   
Easy to Work With State    -.146   .059 
Official Victimization (I)  .117      
Increased Freedoms (I)   .063 -.231 -.120  .135 
Fear and Intimidation        
Identifies W/ Governing Party .138   -.156 -.169  .148 
Identifies W/ Opposition .080  .070    .053  
Less Freedom of Speech     .094 -.071 -.071 
Thinks Interviewer From 
Govt 
  .080      
Electoral System        
List Proportional 
Representation 
-.311 -.092   -.075 -.135 .073 
Mixed System -.185    -.064  .061  
Control Variables        
Rural .000NS -.004NS -.055*** -.046*** -.017NS -.034NS -.043NS 
Adjusted R2 .360 .179 .177 .426 .262 .233 .236 
N 20,343 21,264 18,047 8925 13,128 20,317 21,508 
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While more research is clearly necessary to probe this fascinating and 
consequential finding, it appears that proportional representation in 
Mozambique (and other similarly designed political systems) has had the effect 
of, in the current vernacular, “dumbing down” the body politic.  Besides simply 
reducing the incentives for interaction and mutual learning, removing any clear 
connection between elected representatives and identifiable geographic 
constituencies eliminates an important “cognitive hook” with which citizens 
might otherwise obtain a firmer handle on the political process and on which 
they can hang other pieces of information about government and public affairs.  
Legislators in constituency based systems constitute a key “linkage institutions” 
that connects citizens (especially those in deep rural areas) with the state (see 





We have demonstrated that Mozambicans exhibit a distinctive and problematic 
structure of public attitudes toward democracy and governance.  This profile of 
uncritical citizenship is characterized by low levels of political information, 
relatively high levels of “don’t know” responses, and extremely positive (and 
possibly unreflective) evaluations amongst those who have opinions. This 
syndrome is accompanied by high levels of satisfaction with the supply of 
democracy juxtaposed with low levels of demand for it.  Based on popular 
estimates that their basket of economic and political goods is larger now than a 
few years ago, Mozambicans are satisfied with the progress of Mozambique’s 
democratic experiment. Yet, paradoxically, this optimism stops short of creating 
a widespread demand for democracy. 
 
We have established that a series of cognitive factors (political information, 
formal education and interest in politics) have an important impact, even after 
taking into account the considerable impact of values, on Mozambicans’ 
abilities to provide opinions and form preferences, and on their perceived supply 
of and demand for democracy.  These findings suggest that a significant share of 
the fate of Mozambique’s fledgling democracy will rest on the speed and degree 
to which the government and donors are able to expand educational 
opportunities and access to news media, particularly independent media, in order 
to build critical skills across the body politic.  Finally, we have found strong 
evidence that Mozambique has chosen an electoral system that does nothing to 




society. By removing any identifiable links between voters and elected  
representatives, list proportional representation appears to reduce citizens’ 
ability (or incentive) to learn other key facts about the political system, and thus 
reduces their ability (or incentive) to offer opinions and demand democracy.  
Consequently, electoral reform also ought to occupy a central place on the 
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